The uncertainty premium is the premium that is derived from not knowing the sure outcome (risk premium) and from not knowing the precise odds of outcomes (ambiguity premium). A recent paper by Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (KMM, 2005) generalizes a smooth version of the max-min expected utility model with multiple priors. We construct the uncertainty premium based on the KMM model (generalizing Pratt's risk premium). We show that when consumer preferences are characterized by constant relative risk and ambiguity aversion, the uncertainty premium can decrease with an increase in agent risk aversion. This happens because increasing risk aversion always results in a lower ambiguity premium. Similar qualitative results hold for the case of constant absolute ambiguity aversion. The positive ambiguity premium might give an additional explanation to the equity premium puzzle.
The Uncertainty Premium in an Ambiguous Economy

Introduction
The fundamental assumption of the theories of von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) and Savage (1954) is that agents with an expected utility representation know, or act as if they know, the probabilities of all states. The ambiguity approach to decision making sets aside the assumption of a single set of state probabilities. Instead, agents' beliefs are represented not as a single probability measure on the set of states but as a set of probability measures. The settings in which agents cannot specify precisely the probability distribution has commonly become known in the literature as "Knightian uncertainty" or "ambiguity." Roughly speaking, risk is a situation in which the relative odds of events are known. Contrarily, ambiguity is a condition in which the probabilities of events are either not uniquely assigned or are unknown.
The distinction in economics between risk and uncertainty has become conventional since Knight (1921) . Ellsberg (1961) presented examples, now known as the Ellsberg paradox, which suggest that occasionally individuals prefer to choose when the probabilities are known, and that they are willing to pay in order to avoid choosing in an ambiguous context.
Aiming to explain the Ellsberg paradox (1961), many decision theory models of ambiguity have been proposed. The two most notable models are the max-min expected utility with multiple priors (MEU) model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and the Choquet expected utility (CEU) model of Schmeidler (1989) . Under the Gilboa and Schmeidler model of ambiguity aversion the agent evaluates her ex-ante welfare by computing the expected utility conditional on the worst prior. We can refer to an agent who behaves according to this max-min model as someone who exhibits a form of pessimism. The CEU approach is the non-additive probability measure which is also known as capacity. Gilboa (1987) and Schmeidler (1989) and Barskey (1989) demonstrated that an increases in outcome risk, when the agent is risk averse, raises the equity prices. Abel (2002) has explored the relationship between ambiguity and equity prices. The fact that ambiguity may affect the risk-free rate was first proved by Barsky (1989) . The consequences of ambiguity aversion on the optimal portfolio allocation and equilibrium prices have also been explored by Chen and Epstein (2002) and by Mukerji, Sheppard and Tallon (2005) . Gollier (2005) showed that ambiguity aversion does not necessarily reinforce risk aversion.
In this paper we construct the uncertainty premium based on the KMM ambiguous economy and prove a series of results. We show that an asset's uncertainty premium can be split into two components: The risk premium relates to not knowing the sure result and the ambiguity premium relates to not knowing the precise odds of the outcomes. We show that for a constant relative risk aversion utility function, the uncertainty premium might decreases with an increase in agent risk aversion. This happens because an increasing risk aversion always results in lower ambiguity premium. However, the positive ambiguity premium might give an additional explanation to the equity premium puzzle.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the ambiguous economy under the KMM model. In section 3 we explore a binomial version of the KMM model and show the general form of the uncertainty premium. Section 4 proves our formulation of the uncertainty premium for the case of constant relative risk and ambiguity aversion. Section 5 explores a number of numerical examples for this case. Section 6 generalizes the results to the case of constant absolute ambiguity aversion. Section 7 gives some intuition for our results, and section 8 concludes.
2.
The KMM model of an ambiguous economy
We consider a frictionless economy with a single representative agent. Unlike the classical model, an agent in an ambiguous economy is not only risk averse but also ambiguity averse, where-following Schmeidler and Gilboa, KMM, and others-ambiguity implies that the relative odds of events are not uniquely known. To model preferences in the case of ambiguity, we assume that the agent has a set of probability distributions instead of a single unique distribution over states of nature, and that these preferences are represented by a function of the form:
Here is a real-valued function defined on a state space S of "acts," and u is a VonNeumann-Morgenstern utility function. We use ( )
.., K to represent the set of possible probability distributions over , where each is a probability measure on S .
( ) φ i describes the investor attitude towards ambiguity; and
is the agent's subjective prior over P . The notation V(f supports the MEU model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) , the CEU model of Schmeidler (1989) , as well as
In the Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (KMM, 2005) smooth version of the max-min expected utility model with multiple priors, agent preferences take the double expectation form:
In our case the function represents the agent's consumption. Hence, the agent orders her preferences over random consumption paths by ( )
. In certain specific cases we assume that ( )
exhibits constant relative ambiguity aversion:
where the parameter η measures the curvature of the utility function. The parameterη is also referred as the ambiguity aversion coefficient. We also consider the case where ( ) φ i exhibits constant absolute ambiguity aversion:
We prove our results in a discrete-state framework in which there are two-dates (0 and 1), a countable number of states of world at date 1, and a countable number of probability distributions over states at date 1. Before proving our main results for the general case, we examine a simple binomial framework in which there are two states of the world at date 1, and two probability distributions. This parsimonious binomial framework is fully generalizable and 5 allows for easy exposition of our framework. We denote by u (up) and (down) the two states of world; in terms of aggregate consumption u is the "good" and d is the "bad" state of the world. is the consumption at date 0. The consumption at date 1 is The set of probabilities P contains only two probability distributions: − . The probability that the consequences obey to probability distribution A is ψ and the probability that it obey to probability distribution B is 1 ψ − . When π A = π B the model collapses to a classical non-ambiguous VNM model with uncertainty.
The uncertainty premium in a binomial model
In this section we extend the classic results of Pratt (1964) on the risk premium under uncertainty to our ambiguity framework. Pratt defines the risk premium ρ as follows: Given a risky lottery on consumption c , define the risk premium ρ by In Theorem 1 we extend this result to an ambiguous economy. Following Pratt's definition of the risk premium, we define the uncertainty premium κ as follows: Given a risky and ambiguous lottery on consumption c , define the uncertainty premium κ by
where c E is the expectation of c . To distinguish between the Pratt risk premium and our result, we refer to the latter as the uncertainty premium.
Theorem 1:
Assume an ambiguous economy with a risk and ambiguity averse agent. Denote the expected consumption by
, and the variance of expected consumption by
Then the uncertainty premium is given by:
Proof: See Appendix.
Note 1: In an ambiguous economy (i.e., when the probability distribution is not perfectly known), the generalization of Pratt's risk premium consists of two parts. We refer to 
An increasing dispersion of priors within the agent's set of prior leads to higher variance of expected consumption, 2 μ σ , where it is clear that higher 2 μ σ increases the ambiguity premium.
The ambiguity premium in Theorem 1 is based on the Taylor series approximation of the actual uncertainty premium
around the expected consumption c . Although in general this approximation is accurate only for a neighborhood of c , when
is monotonic in the risk aversion and the ambiguity aversion parameters then our construction is accurate for the entire domain.
The uncertainty premium under constant relative risk aversion and constant relative ambiguity aversion
In this section we analyze the uncertainty premium under the assumption that the agent's attitude toward risk is constant relative risk aversion attitude (CRRA) and her attitude toward ambiguity is constant relative ambiguity aversion attitude (CRAA).
We adopt the normalized utility function:
This utility function exhibits constant relative risk aversion with γ as the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
The uncertainty premium under constant relative risk aversion and constant absolute ambiguity aversion
In this section we analyze the uncertainty premium under the assumption that the agent's attitude toward risk is constant relative risk aversion attitude (CRRA) and her attitude toward ambiguity is constant absolute ambiguity aversion attitude (CAAA). This follows examples given by KMM. Note that when the ambiguity attitude is given by ( ) 
Intuition
In the previous sections we demonstrated that increasing risk aversion might lead to a decreasing ambiguity premium. At the first glance this looks counter intuitive. One might expect that increasing risk aversion would increase the ambiguity premium or at least would not affect it. However, we proved that risk aversion has a negative effect on the ambiguity premium.
This phenomenon can be explained by a careful look at the KMM model.
KMM model the agent's attitude toward ambiguity as her attitude toward the dispersion of expected utilities. The concavity of ( ) φ i , which is a second-order utility function operating on the set of expected utilities, represents the agent's ambiguity aversion. As the agent is more ambiguity averse ( ) φ i becomes more concave.
The ambiguity premium is the premium that the agent is willing to pay in order to avoid the dispersion of expected utilities. The agent is willing to pay a higher ambiguity premium in order to avoid a greater dispersion of expected utilities. The dispersion of expected utility can be referred as ambiguity degree.
We showed in Theorem 1 that the ambiguity premium can be formularized by ( increases, then decreasing ambiguity degree leads to lower ambiguity premium. Figure 6 illustrates the effect of increasing risk aversion on the dispersion of expected utilities. In this example we set the optional consumptions to be either 8.
Conclusions
In this paper we construct the uncertainty premium based on the Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005) ambiguous economy. Some of our results may appear counter-intuitive. For example, it might be thought that increasing risk aversion or ambiguity aversion will cause the agent to be more reluctant to buy risky assets, and that, therefore, a higher uncertainty premium is required as compensation. However, we prove that using the KMM ambiguity model for a constant relative risk aversion utility function does not always give these results: The intuition that higher risk or ambiguity aversion will lead to a higher uncertainty premium is true for the case of both ambiguity and risk aversion lower than unity. However, in the case of an ambiguity aversion greater than 
